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PARADOXES OF RATIONAL AGENCY AND FORMAL
SYSTEMS THAT VERIFY THEIR OWN SOUNDNESS
NIK WEAVER
Abstract. We consider extensions of Peano arithmetic which include an as-
sertibility predicate. Any such system which is arithmetically sound effectively
verifies its own soundness. This leads to the resolution of a range of paradoxes
involving rational agents who are licensed to act under precisely defined con-
ditions.
1. Paradoxes of rational agency
Let S be a recursively axiomatized formal system that interprets Peano arith-
metic (PA). The soundness of S is characterized by the scheme
ProvSpA(n¯1, . . . , n¯k)q→ A(n1, . . . , nk) (∗)
(“if A is provable within S, then A”), with A ranging over the formulas of the
language of S. Here n1, . . . , nk are the free variables of A, n¯ is the nth numeral, pAq
is the Go¨del number of A, and ProvSpAq is some standard arithmetical formulation
of the assertion that A is a theorem of S.
The assertion that S is consistent is effectively the special case of (∗) when A
is any sentence which is provably false in S. Thus, according to Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem, if S is consistent then it cannot prove any such instance
of (∗). Indeed, Lo¨b’s theorem asserts that if S is consistent then it can only prove
ProvSpAq→ A when it can prove A.
The inability of a rational agent who reasons within S to affirm the soundness,
or even the consistency, of S is an unhappy but familiar phenomenon. However, in
a recent paper [5] Yudkowsky and Herreshoff observe that this phenomenon carries
a sharper sting in the context of an AI that is licensed to act under precisely defined
conditions. Thus, imagine an intelligent machine M that is capable of reasoning
within S and is licensed to perform some action α0 when it has verified the truth
of some sentence A0. We now describe a variety of situations, mostly adapted from
Section 3 of [5], in which M is paradoxically unable to justify performing α0 even
though it intuitively ought to be able to do so.
1.1. Naturalistic trust. Suppose M decides to improve its performance by con-
structing an assistant M ′ whose job is to prove theorems for M . M programs
the assistant to reason within the same system S that M reasons in, and to alert
M when it has proven the sentence A0 (or any other sentence which expresses an
actionable criterion for M).
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The paradox is that even though M knows that M ′ reasons within S, it cannot
act on the information that M ′ has proven A0. Knowing this tells M only that A0
is provable in S, not that A0 is true, and lacking the soundness scheme (∗) it cannot
infer A0 from ProvSpA0q. In fact nothing M
′ can tell M , short of a line by line
account of the actual proof, could convince M that A0 is true. So apparently the
best M can do in this situation is to retrieve the formal proof of A0 from M
′ and
check it line by line, thereby establishing A0 to M ’s own satisfaction and licensing
the action α0.
The puzzle here is that M knows perfectly well what the outcome of this verifi-
cation is going to be, but still has no way to get around executing it in its entirety.
Lo¨b’s theorem preventsM from “trusting” an agent in its environment, even grant-
ing that M has perfect knowledge that the agent reasons correctly within S.
1.2. Reflective trust. Alternatively, there can be situations in which it might be
relatively easy for M to prove the statement ProvSpA0q, and even to produce an
algorithm which provably generates a formal proof of A0, but unfeasably difficult
for M to actually execute that algorithm. The formal proof of A0 might be as-
tronomically long, for example, even while the proof that it can be constructed is
quite short. Again, M finds itself in a situation where it “knows” that it can prove
A0, but is unable to act on this knowledge without first performing some tedious
or even unfeasable computation whose result is known in advance. Evidently M
cannot even trust itself.
The paradoxes of naturalistic and reflective trust are both straightforward ex-
pressions of M ’s inability to affirm the soundness scheme (∗), and both of them
could be easily handled by modifying its licensing criteria. All we have to do is to
program M so that whenever it accepts a sentence A as a license to perform the
action α, it also accepts ProvSpAq as a license to perform α. This would allow it
to act on the knowledge that A is provable — knowledge that it might derive on its
own or obtain from an outside source — without actually possessing a proof of A.
Next we present two additional difficulties which cannot be handled in this way.
1.3. Reflectively coherent trust. Suppose the actionable condition has the form
(∀n)A0(n). It could be the case that M is able to prove each instance A0(n¯), yet
not able to prove the quantified statement (∀n)A0(n).
So far, there is nothing worrisome about this possibility. It could easily happen
that each instance A0(n¯) is verifiable by a finite computation, yet there is no uniform
reason why A0(n) is true for every n. (Think of assertions like “the first through
nth digits in the decimal expansion of pi do not contain a string of 100 consecutive
9’s”.) But suppose in addition that M knows that for each n it can prove A0(n¯).
That is, suppose M has proven the sentence
(∀n)ProvSpA0(n¯)q.
Without knowing that S is sound,M cannot go on to infer the condition (∀n)A0(n)
which allows it to act.
Yudkowsky and Herreshoff ask whether it is possible to design the formal system
S in a way that evades this problem. That is, can S have the property that whenever
(∀n)ProvSpA(n¯)q is a theorem of S, it is also the case that (∀n)A(n) is a theorem
of S?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. No consistent recursively axiomatized system
which interprets Peano arithmetic is reflectively coherent in this sense. For let S
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be any recursively axiomatized system which interprets PA. We claim that we can
prove, in S, the statement (∀g)ProvSpA(g¯)q where A(g) is a standard arithmetiza-
tion of the assertion “g is not the Go¨del number of a proof in S of 0 = 1”. This
is done as follows. Reasoning informally in S, we argue that for each g, either g is
not a proof of 0 = 1, in which case this fact can be verified by a mechanical finite
computation and hence is trivially provable in S, or else g is a proof of 0 = 1, in
which case S is inconsistent and therefore proves anything. (This argument appears
in [1], Section 2 (d).) Thus, reflective coherence would entail that S can prove its
own consistency, contradicting Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem as improved
by Rosser.
However, it still seems reasonable to expect M to be able to accept a proof
of (∀n)ProvSpA(n¯)q as licensing the same actions that are licensed by a proof of
(∀n)A(n). The point here is that agreeing to accept ProvSp(∀n)A(n)q as a licensing
condition, as proposed above, does not accomplish this. We should also note that
the issue is no longer about feasability: it may simply be impossible for M to
convince itself that (∀n)A(n) holds, despite knowing that (∀n)ProvSpA(n¯)q.
1.4. Disjunctive trust. Finally, suppose the actionable condition is the sen-
tence A0 and we follow the suggestion made above to program M to also accept
ProvSpA0q, ProvSpProvSpA0qq, etc., as licensing the same action. This does not
accomodate the possibility thatM might prove the sentence A0∨ProvSpA0q. (This
formulation of the disjunctive trust problem was suggested to me by Cameron
Freer.) Intuitively, the preceding sentence tells us that either A0 is true, which
licenses action, or else A0 is provable and therefore true, which also licenses ac-
tion. So A0 ∨ ProvSpA0q “should” license action, but it does not. We cannot
straightforwardly infer either A0 or Prov
k
SpA0q for any k.
A natural idea is to augment S with a truth predicate. This would enable us
to formalize the reasoning we just used which allowed us to infer the truth of A0
from the provability of A0 ∨ProvSpA0q. The problem is that self-applicative truth
predicates are inconsistent, whereas a non self-applicative truth predicate would
only apply to reasoning carried out in the original system, not the augmented
system. Thus M could still find itself in a situation where it has proven that it
can prove A0, but is unable to infer A0 because the anticipated proof of A0 makes
use of the truth predicate. A partially self-applicative truth predicate a la Kripke
would not do any better; by Lo¨b’s theorem it is simply impossible to consistently
augment S in any way that would enable us to generally infer A from ProvS+pAq,
where ProvS+ refers to provability in the augmented system S
+.
As we have seen, the paradoxes of reflective coherence and disjunctive trust are
not resolved by broadening the licensing criteria so that ProvSpAq licenses any
action that A licenses. There can still be provable assertions which ought to license
actions but do not. Another possibility is to simply ignore the provability predicate
for licensing purposes; that is, program M so that whenever A licenses α, so does
any sentence which reduces to A when all provability predicates are removed. But
this idea is a non-starter because provably true sentences can become false when
provability predicates are removed. For instance, we can prove in PA that
ProvPApCon(PA)q→ ProvPAp0 = 1q
4 NIK WEAVER
(if PA proves its own consistency, then it is inconsistent) but after removing the
provability predicates this becomes
Con(PA)→ 0 = 1,
i.e., ¬Con(PA).
What we need is a principled method of broadening some initially given licensing
criteria that goes beyond merely accepting ProvpAq in place of A.
2. Formalizing assertibility
We propose to handle the paradoxes of rational agency using the notion of assert-
ibility — more precisely, rational or warranted assertibility. This is a philosophical
term which is supposed to identify a property of sentences that expresses our right
to assert them. The idea is that a sentence is assertible if it has a perfect rational
justification or “warrant”. In a mathematical context the warrant may be thought
of as a proof, in the semantic sense of argument that provides a perfect rational
justification, not in the syntactic sense of formal proof within some formal system.
In intuitionism the word “provability” is used in the former sense, and thus for our
purposes is synonymous with assertibility.
One could object that this notion of assertibility or provability is either altogether
meaningless, or at best too vague to support precise analysis. A philosophical argu-
ment can be made against this objection, but perhaps the best answer is to simply
exhibit a formal treatment of assertibility. An axiomatization was given in [2]; it
goes as follows. Let  be a predicate symbol which represents “is assertible” and
is to be applied to Go¨del numbers of sentences in some language (which, crucially,
might itself employ the symbol ). There are five axioms for ,
(1) pA ∨Bq ↔ pAq ∨pBq
(2) pA ∧Bq ↔ pAq ∧pBq
(3) p(∃n)A(n)q ← (∃n)pA(n¯)q
(4) p(∀n)A(n)q ↔ (∀n)pA(n¯)q
(5) pA→ Bq → pAq→ pBq,
and one axiom scheme, capture, which states
(6) A(n1, . . . , nk) → pA(n¯1, . . . , n¯k)q
for every formula A. Intuitionistic logic is to be used; we do not assume that the
law of excluded middle holds for formulas which involve .
There is no separate axiom for negation. We treat negation as a derived symbol,
such that ¬A is an abbreviation of A →⊥ where ⊥ is some canonical falsehood
such as 0 = 1.
The justification for these axioms is discussed in detail in [2]. The main points
are that the logic is intuitionistic and that the release principle pAq → A is
not included. Excluded middle is suspect because we cannot a priori assign truth
values to all statements of the form pAq: if putative proofs can refer to each
other, such that the validity of one hinges on the validity of the other, then there
is a potential circularity issue which could make the assignment of truth values
problematic. Similarly, whenever we have actually proven that a sentence A is
provable we ought to be able to rationally infer A, but the implication pAq→ A
is suspect because it globally affirms the validity of all proofs, including proofs in
which it itself might have been used, creating another circularity issue.
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(The capture scheme is constructively valid because we can simply stipulate that
any proof of A must be recognizable as a proof. Thus, any proof of A can trivially
be converted into a proof that A is provable.)
A surprising feature of the  operator is that it can be applied self-referentially
without producing a contradiction. For example, consider a sentence L that says
of itself that it is not assertible. Thus, we have L ≡ ¬pLq. Then we can make
the following deductions. First, assuming L lets us immediately infer ¬pLq, and
it also lets us infer pLq via capture. Thus L entails a statement and its negation,
so we may conclude ¬L. We can further deduce p¬Lq. However, there is no
contradiction here. In particular, we cannot proceed to infer ¬pLq, only the
weaker statement pLq→ p⊥q.
We do not merely claim that simple attempts to derive a contradiction fail. We
can actually give consistency proofs for systems which allow the formulation of
assertibility versions of the liar paradox and Russell’s paradox ([2] and [4]; see also
[3]). See also Theorem 3.2 below.
It is interesting to note that including either the law of excluded middle or a
release axiom scheme would make assertibility reasoning paradoxical. If we knew
pLq → L, then together with ¬L, which we just proved, we could infer ¬pLq.
But that is equivalent to L, so we would have proven both L and ¬L, a contradic-
tion. Or again, if we knew pLq ∨ ¬pLq then we could reason as follows. First,
assume pLq. Since we have already proven ¬L, we also have p¬Lq. This yields
pL ∧ ¬Lq, and a short argument then gives us p⊥q. On the other hand, if we
assume ¬pLq then, as above, we can infer ⊥ and from this p⊥q. Thus, if we
had the law of excluded middle then we could prove p⊥q. So excluded middle
forces us to affirm a contradiction.
3. Self-verifying systems
In what follows we employ intuitionistic logic and take ⊥ to be the formula 0 = 1.
Systems using classical logic can be accomodated by including all instances of the
law of excluded middle as non-logical axioms. Thus, for example, we treat Peano
arithmetic as an intuitionistic system but include as non-logical axioms all formulas
of the form A ∨ ¬A with A a formula of first order arithmetic.
It is convenient to exclude formulas with free variables from our formal proofs.
Thus we require all axioms to be sentences and we express the generalization de-
duction rules as the implications
(∀n1, . . . , nk)(A→ B)→ (∀n2, . . . , nk)(A→ (∀n1)B)
(whenever n1 is not free in A) and
(∀n1, . . . , nk)(A→ B)→ (∀n2, . . . , nk)((∃n1)A→ B)
(whenever n1 is not free in B). The only deduction rule we need then is modus
ponens in the form
given (∀n1, . . . , nk)A and (∀n1, . . . , nk)(A→ B), infer (∀n1, . . . , nk)B.
In this section we assume S is a recursively axiomatized theory in the language
of first order arithmetic which extends PA. Define a formal system S as follows.
Its language is the language of first order arithmetic enriched by a single unary
relation symbol . Fix a Go¨del numbering for this language. The main axioms of
S consist of the universal closures of
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• the non-logical axioms of S,
• all instances of the induction scheme and the logical axiom schemes for
formulas in the language of S, and
• all of the axioms (1) – (6) for  given in the last section, for the language
of S.
(For details on how one would formalize, e.g., axioms (3) and (4) for , see Section
2 (c) of [1].) Also, let Ax(g) be a formula in the language of first order arithmetic
which expresses that g is the Go¨del number of one of the main axioms. We can
assume that whenever Ax(g¯) holds this is provable in PA. Besides its main axioms,
S has one additional jump axiom given by the formula
(∀g)(Ax(g)→ (g)).
Let ProvS(g) be a standardly expressed formula stating that g is the Go¨del
number of a theorem of S. (Recall that in our setup every theorem is a sentence.)
We now show that S verifies its own soundness in the sense that it proves a single
statement which affirms that every theorem of S is assertible.
Theorem 3.1. The sentences
(∀g)(ProvS(g)→ (g))
(assertible soundness) and
pCon(S)q
(assertible consistency) are provable in S.
Proof. Working in S, we know from the jump axiom that we have (g) whenever
g is the Go¨del number of one of the main axioms. Also, if B is the jump axiom
itself then we can use capture to infer pBq. So we can show, in S, that (g)
holds for any g which is the Go¨del number of any of the axioms of S.
Still working in S, we proceed to prove (g) whenever g is the Go¨del number
of any sentence that is provable in S. Given any proof of such a sentence, we
inductively verify (g′) as g′ ranges over the Go¨del numbers of the lines of the
proof. Given the result of the preceding paragraph, we just have to show how
to handle deduction via universally quantified modus ponens. We do this with
deductions of the form
given p(∀n)A(n)q, p(∀n)(A(n)→ B(n))q
infer (∀n)pA(n¯)q, (∀n)pA(n¯)→ B(n¯)q
infer (∀n)(pA(n¯)q ∧pA(n¯)→ B(n¯)q)
infer (∀n)pB(n¯)q
infer p(∀n)B(n)q
(assuming here only one universal quantifier for the sake of notational simplicity).
This completes the proof of assertible soundness. For assertible consistency, re-
call from Section 1.3 that S proves the statement (∀g)ProvSpA(g¯)q where A(g)
arithmetizes the assertion that g is not the Go¨del number of a proof in S of 0 = 1.
By assertible soundness we can infer (∀g)pA(g¯)q, and then using box axiom (4)
we can infer p(∀g)A(g)q, i.e., pCon(S)q. 
Using Go¨delian self-reference techniques it is not hard to write down a sentence in
the language of S which says of itself that it is not assertible. But as we discussed
earlier, no contradiction results. We will now prove that S is consistent, provided
S is sound (i.e., the axioms of S are true statements of first order arithmetic).
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The systems described in [2] and [4] also included the release principle in the form
of a deduction rule which allows the inference of A from pAq. The justification
for this rule is that whenever we have actually proven that A is assertible we should
be entitled to assert A. Thus, having accepted a system that does not employ the
release rule we can successively accept proofs that employ one use of the rule, then
proofs that employ two uses, and so on.
In the present paper we exclude the release rule because it complicates Theorem
3.1: ProvSpAq would no longer imply pAq, it would imply 
k+1
pAq where k is
the number of uses of the release rule in a proof of A. However, the point stands
that proofs of not only A, but also pAq, ppAqq, . . ., all affirm “trust” in the
semantic content of A. Thus a consistency result for S should not only show that
0 = 1 is unprovable, it should show that k+1p0 = 1q ≡ pp· · ·0 = 1 · · ·qq (k+1
terms) is unprovable for all k. This is what we establish now. The argument is
similar to the proofs of Theorem 6.1 of [2] and Theorem 5.1 of [4].
Theorem 3.2. If S is sound and A is a false sentence of first order arithmetic,
then A is not a theorem of S, nor is 
k
pAq for any k ≥ 1.
Proof. We define a sequence (Fi) such that each Fi is a set of sentences in the
language of S. Intuitively, these are sentences that we determine to be false. The
definition proceeds by recursion on i, and for a given value of i by recursion on the
complexity of a sentence. Fixing i, we define Fi as follows. The atomic sentences
have the form t = t′ and (t) where t and t′ are numerical terms (i.e., they contain
no variables). Put t = t′ in Fi if t and t
′ numerically evaluate to different numbers,
and put (t) in Fi if t evaluates to the Go¨del number of a sentence that belongs to
Fi−1. We do not place any sentence of the form (t) in F0.
Place A ∧ B in Fi if either A or B belongs to Fi; place A ∨ B in Fi if both A
and B belong to Fi; place (∀n)A(n) in Fi if A(n¯) belongs to Fi for some n; place
(∃n)A(n) in Fi if A(n¯) belongs to Fi for all n. Place A→ B in Fi if for some j ≤ i
we have A 6∈ Fj and B ∈ Fj .
It is easy to see that Fi ⊆ Fi+1 for all i. Let F =
⋃
i Fi. It is tedious but
straightforward to verify both that no axiom of S belongs to F and that the
complement of F is stable under universally quantified modus ponens. Thus no
theorem of S lies in F . But every false sentence of first order arithmetic belongs
to F0, so 
k
pAq belongs to Fk for every k ≥ 1. So none of these statements can be
a theorem of S. 
It is easy to see that consistency of S implies consistency of S; any model of
S can be extended to a model of S by letting (g) hold for all g. However, mere
consistency of S is not sufficient to guarantee that p0 = 1q is unprovable in S.
For example, take S to be PA + ¬Con(PA). Then Theorem 3.1 shows that S
proves
ProvSp0 = 1q→ p0 = 1q,
but we can also infer ProvSp0 = 1q from ¬Con(PA) ≡ ProvPAp0 = 1q, so that
p0 = 1q is a theorem of S.
4. Resolving the paradoxes
We propose the following uniform resolution of the paradoxes of rational agency
discussed in Section 1. First, we require agents to reason within systems that have
an assertibility predicate satisfying the axioms for  and for which we are able
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to prove a version of Theorem 3.1. This addresses their inability to affirm the
consistency and soundness of their own reasoning. We also impose the following
licensing rule.
Box rule: Whenever a sentence A licenses some action α, the
sentence pAq also licenses α.
The resolution of the paradoxes is now simple and straightforward. Whenever
ProvSpAq is a theorem, so is pAq. Therefore, according to the box rule, know-
ing that A is provable is always just as actionable as knowing A. This handles
naturalistic and reflective trust. For reflectively coherent trust, observe that
(∀n)ProvSpA(n¯)q→ (∀n)pA(n¯)q→ p(∀n)A(n)q,
provably in S. So (∀n)ProvSpA(n¯)q is just as actionable as (∀n)A(n). Finally,
disjunctive trust is handled by the inference
(A ∨ ProvSpAq)→ (A ∨pAq)→ (pAq ∨pAq)→ pAq,
which shows that A ∨ ProvSpAq is just as actionable as A.
Do we get too much? For instance, is ProvPApCon(PA)q→ ProvPAp0 = 1q just
as actionable as Con(PA) → 0 = 1? No, because the implication ProvSpAq →
pAq only goes in one direction, and besides, we cannot bring an implication inside
the box operator. So there is no way to remove the provability predicates in this
case.
We do not mean to imply that rational agents should be required to work in
the language of first order arithmetic. That is merely a convenient vehicle for the
results we proved in Section 3, but all kinds of formal systems are amenable to
augmentation by an assertibility operator. For instance, a version of Theorem 3.2
for ZFC should be provable under the assumption that inaccessible cardinals exist.
5. Self-modifying AI
We have not yet addressed the main concern of [5], which involves a rational agent
who is seeking not a license to perform a particular action, but general permission to
delegate the performance of actions to a second agent. This is more difficult because
the first agent does not merely have to sanction the second agent’s judgement
that some particular action has been licensed, as in the naturalistic trust paradox.
Rather, the first agent is required to globally affirm the correctness of any such
judgement the second agent might make.
The same issues appear in the case of an intelligent machine that is considering
modifying its own source code (in order to make itself more intelligent, say). Before
doing this it would want to be sure that its post-modification state will reason
correctly, i.e., any theorem it proves after the modification should actually be true.
This runs into the familiar Lo¨bian difficulty that the agent is not even able to affirm
the soundness of its pre-modification reasoning.
One way to deal with this problem is to forbid the second agent from performing
any action, reducing it to the role of a theorem proving assistant. By allowing the
second agent only to think, not to act, we effectively convert the problem into a
type of naturalistic trust question that we already know how to handle. In the
self-modification scenario this could amount to putting a restriction on which parts
of the machine’s source code it is allowed to rewrite.
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If one insists on allowing the second agent to act the problem becomes much
harder. In Section 4 of [5], two constructions are presented of an infinite sequence
of independently acting agents, each of whom can give a provable justification for
activating the next one, yet none of whose deductive power falls below an initially
prescribed level. The constructions are clever but they have a nonstandard flavor.
Probably this is unavoidable, unless the problem description were to be altered in
some fundamental way. In the remainder of this section we present another solution
which uses nonstandard assertibility reasoning.
We begin by setting up some formalism. Enumerate the possible actions the
first agent M1 can take. Let S be a base system that uses the language of first
order arithmetic augmented by some additional relation symbols. We assume that
using these extra symbols it is possible to formulate an expression ActM1(n) which
represents the event that M1 takes the nth action. Also let Γ be a propositional
symbol (i.e., a nullary relation symbol) which represents the event that some desired
goal G is achieved. Next, we augment S by introducing an infinite sequence of
constant symbols (κi) together with, for each i, the axiom κi = κi+1 + 1. Call the
resulting system S∗. It is clear that if S is consistent, then so is any finite fragment
of S∗, and therefore so is S∗.
Although its language is slightly richer than the language used in Section 3, we
can still augment S∗ with an assertibility predicate to get a new system S∗

in the
manner described there. We assume that versions of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 hold for
S∗

.
Following [5], we impose a condition that M1 only acts if it can prove that doing
so will achieve G. This licensing criterion could be formalized in S by the formula
ActM1(n)→ Γ, but we weaken it by inserting an assertibility operator to require
ActM1(n)→ 
κ1pΓq (†)
for the first agent,
ActM2(n)→ 
κ2pΓq
for its successor agent, and so on. Thus the condition which describes when M1
acts is
(∀n)(ActM1(n)→ ProvS∗

pActM1(n¯)→ 
κ1pΓqq).
Now assume that M1 can prove the corresponding condition
(∀n)(ActM2(n)→ ProvS∗

pActM2(n¯)→ 
κ2pΓqq) (1)
that describes when M2 acts. Since M1 will not activate M2 unless it can trust
that M2 will achieve G, we also assume that M1 can prove
ActM1(n¯0)→ (∃n)ActM2(n) (2)
where n¯0 indexes the action of activating M2; that is, M1 knows that if M2 is
activated then it will act in some way. (This could be trivial if we know there is
a brute force method of achieving G and want M2 to look for an efficient method.
Alternatively, we could alter the definition of G so that, say, an exhaustive search
which fails to find any way to accomplish the desired goal, counts as an acceptable
outcome.)
In order to license activating M2, we must prove the sentence ActM1(n¯0) →

κ1pΓq. This can be done as follows. Working in S∗

, combine (1) and (2) to get
ActM1(n¯0)→ (∃n)[ActM2(n) ∧ ProvS∗

pActM2(n¯)→ 
κ2pΓqq].
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Theorem 3.1 then yields
ActM1(n¯0)→ (∃n)[ActM2(n) ∧pActM2(n¯)→ 
κ2pΓqq]
which simplifies to
ActM1(n¯0)→ p(∃n)[ActM2(n) ∧ (ActM2(n)→ 
κ2pΓq)]q
then to
ActM1(n¯0)→ p
κ2pΓqq
and finally to
ActM1(n¯0)→ 
κ1pΓq
as desired. Thus M1 is licensed to activate M2. Similarly, M2 can be licensed to
activate a third agent M3, and so on. All of these agents reason within the same
formal system S∗

, but they respond to different licensing criteria.
The licensing criteria appear to become stricter for later agents, which is why
each Mi is able to accept the validity of actions performed on the basis of Mi+1’s
licensing criteria. However, since the κi do not have definite values the criteria for
Mi and Mi+1 are effectively equivalent.
A possible intuition is that κ1 is some unspecified very large number. This seems
like a fairly reasonable intuition for a formal system that is admittedly nonstandard.
As we mentioned earlier, it seems unlikely that there is any standard solution to
the problem of delegated action as it is currently posed.
The licensing criteria for the Mi do not respect the box rule. That could be
accomodated by introducing transfinite degrees of assertibility and accepting

j
pActMi(n¯)→ 
κi·ωpΓqp
for any value of j as a license for Mi to execute the nth action. But we do not
pursue this direction.
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